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Abstract: Chinese judicial opinions were, for a long time, not readily acces-
sible even by the courts. But an emerging norm of judicial transparency,
coupled with the technological advances of the last decade, has resulted in
the accumulation of vast bodies of cases available for consultation by both
the lay and the learned. These recent developments in the Chinese legal
landscape allow judges to influence and be influenced by the decisions of
judges sitting in other courts. This project is the first to adopt an experi-
mental approach to evaluating the influence of prior judicial decisions on
Chinese judges. We find that citation of a case out of a sister court had a
substantial and statistically significant effect on judges’ interpretation of a
vague, permissive, legal standard. This effect was not, however, accompanied
by a reduction in the length of sentences awarded by judges. An additional
study suggests that prior judicial decisions have an indistinguishable influ-
ence on judges and law students, indicating that role and environment are
unlikely to be the explanation for the main result.
Keywords: China, judicial transparency, judicial decisionmaking, precedent,
experiment
Introduction
Policies that are introduced in one jurisdiction often shape those adopted by
other jurisdictions through a process of “diffusion” (Shipan and Volden, 2012).
Diffusion may occur as legislators and bureaucrats learn about innovations in
other states through conferences and the media, but it could also occur through
the transmission of judicial decisions. The former has been intensively studied
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in the Chinese context (See Teets and Hurst, 2014; Cho, 2008, pp. 15, 165; Xia,
2007, pp. 163–164; Zhu, 2014; Ma, 2014; Heilmann et al., 2013; Zhang, 2012). The
latter has, however, been neglected, not least because judicial opinions were, for
a long time, not made accessible, even to the courts.
But an emerging norm of judicial transparency, coupled with the technolo-
gical advances of the last decade, has resulted in the accumulation of vast
bodies of cases available for consultation by both the lay and the learned.
Today, the references available to a Chinese judge include not only the print
volumes of the Supreme People’s Court Gazette,1 the Chinese Guiding Cases,2
and the Selected Cases of the People’s Courts,3 but also online databases of
cases from courts at all levels of judicial hierarchy in different Chinese
jurisdictions.
These recent developments in the Chinese legal landscape allow judges to
influence and be influenced by the decisions of judges sitting in other courts
(Liebman and Wu, 2007, pp. 291–294). As the emergence of “an informal system
of precedent may significantly change the Chinese legal system,” (Liebman and
Wu, 2007, p. 291) the existence, extent, and nature of any such influence is of
relevance to both scholars and practitioners. We seek traction on this question
by fielding a survey experiment.
The Chinese context
The doctrine of stare decisis has become so firmly entrenched in American legal
culture that the impression of precedent on the judicial mind is hardly ever
doubted.4 But the legal status of cases in the Chinese legal system has waxed
and waned over the centuries. Although statutes have constituted the dominant
source of law since imperial times, the recognition of prior judicial decisions as
1 This official publication has been regularly published by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court
since 1985 (at first, issued quarterly; between 1989 and 2004, issued once every two months;
after 2004, issued monthly). It carries important national legislation, official documents, judi-
cial interpretations and a selection of civil, criminal, economic, marine, and administrative
judicial decisions that have been adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s
Court. Available at: http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/zgrmfygb/.
2 Since December 21, 2011, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court has published Guiding Cases
that must be referred to by courts at all levels.
3 The Selected Cases of the People’s Courts is a quarterly publication issued by the China
Institute of Applied Jurisprudence under the Supreme People’s Court. The table of contents for
each issue is available at http://www.court.gov.cn/yyfx/yyfxyj/alyj/rmfyalx/.
4 For a history, see Kempin (1959).
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precedential dates back at least to the Qin dynasty (Liu, 1991, pp. 109–110).
Under the Qin, cases furnished the legal basis for adjudications in the absence of
enacted law, or where the enacted law was erroneous or vague (Dong, 2015, pp.
19–22; Yang, 2015, p. 242).5 During the Han dynasty, judgments that had been
approved by the emperor were used to fill the interstices of the law.6 In Song
China, prior judicial decisions carrying the stamp of imperial authority could
even trump statutory provisions to the contrary (Yang, 2015, p. 242; Liu, 1991, pp.
110–111). By the time of the Qing dynasty, attention to cases had become
“indispensable to legal reasoning,” and reasoning by analogy, a “universally
accepted [method] in Qing decision-making” (Wang, 2005, p. 334; Qin and Zhou,
1995, p. 335). Qing judges deduced abstract rules from a body of cases and
distinguished them based on factual and statutory considerations (Wang, 2005,
pp. 334–340). This tradition carried on into early modern China, and judgments
continued to be collected for judicial use even amidst the turmoil of the Second
Sino-Japanese War and Chinese Civil War (Dong, 2015).7
The ascension of Mao’s communist government in 1949 ended the use of
cases as a source of law (Liu, 1991, p. 112).8 Although cases were occasionally
used for the training of judicial officers, these internally circulated materials
were not made available to the public (Liu, 1991, pp. 112–113). The aftermath of
the Cultural Revolution and the need to cabin judicial discretion in criminal
sentencing, however, led the Chinese Supreme People’s Court to commence, in
5 The system of precedent officially established in the Qin dynasty had its roots in the practices
of the Xia-Shang dynasties and Western Zhou dynasty. Before Qin, given the absence of rules
for conviction and punishment, emperors decided a case according to previous judgments or
“stories.” Stories formed the basis for judgments and were later recorded and compiled in “The
Spring and Autumn Annals.” In addition, six major rules for the use of stories were formulated:
(1) follow previous stories; (2) prudently select the stories to be applied; stories without general
guidance should not be used; (3) a case should be decided by more than one person; (4) sort
and record typical stories for further modification in light of contemporary situations and facts;
(5) create new precedent if necessary; (6) illegal stories should not be precedents (Dong, 2015,
pp. 19–22; Wu, 1998, pp. 25–30).
6 In Han China, there are four forms of law: “lv,” “ling,” “ke” and “bi.” “Bi” refers to precedents
that may be used as the basis for deciding cases (Cui, 1988, p. 11).
7 One of the largest collection of cases during this time was “The Compilation of Judicial Cases
of Shan Gan Ning Border Region” edited by the highest court of Shan Gan Ning Border Region
in 1944. It contained 77 prior judgments decided by the government adjudication committee, the
highest court, and local courts of the Shan Gan Ning Border Region.
8 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1954) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of
China (1954)] (promulgated by National People’s Congress, Sep. 20, 1954, effective Sep. 20,
1954), art. 78, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=52993 (“In administering
justice the people’s courts are independent, subject only to the law.”).
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1985, the publication of selected cases in its Gazette so as to “provide better
guidance to local courts for correctly applying laws and decrees” (He, 2008; Yao,
2008). Beginning in December 2011, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court has
also issued Guiding Cases. As of April 2017, 87 such cases have been promul-
gated. Although described as Guiding Cases, lower courts have to take reference
from them.9
During this time, Chinese courts have also begun to experiment with intra-
court systems of precedent. For example, in July 2002, a basic people’s court in
Zhongyuan, Zhengchou, introduced “a process whereby a holding shall be
recognized as a ‘precedent’ with a certain degree of binding effect in the
adjudication of similar cases in the future, which other panels and individual
judges should refer to in handling similar cases” (Lin, 2003, pp. 300–301;
Liebman and Wu, 2007, p. 290). In October 2002, the Tianjin City High
People’s Court piloted a similar innovation (Lin, 2003, p. 302). The Zhuhai
Municipal Intermediate People’s Court likewise circulated, in June 2008, eight
“exemplary cases” that may be quoted, but not cited, for their legal reasoning
and that may serve as the basis for the modification of a judgment on retrial or
appeal (Dong, 2015, p. 172). Presiding Judge Li Guanghu of the Zhongyuan Basic
People’s Court took care to explain the difference between his court’s system of
precedent and the common law doctrine of stare decisis. Among other things,
precedent in the local court has “binding effect only on itself but not on other
courts at the same level” (Dong, 2015, p. 109). Hence, there is no contradiction
between the use of precedent and the civil law principle that laws are to be
made only by the legislature (Dong, 2015, p. 109).
The nascent interest in intra-court consistency has coincided with, and been
overshadowed by, the rise of databases brought about by an emphasis on
transparency (Hou and Keith, 2012). Seeking to dispel perceptions of judicial
corruption through public education and oversight (Hou and Keith, 2012), the
Chinese Supreme People’s Court, in 2009, issued a notice that
[t]he people’s courts may, according to the needs of legal advocacy, law research, case
guidance and unification of standards for judgment, compile, print and publish various
9 See Zuigao Remin Fayuan Yinfa “Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo de Guiding” [Notice of the
Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Provisions on Case Guidance] (promulgated by the
Supreme People’s Court, Nov. 26, 2011, effective Nov. 26, 2011), art. 7, http://www.pkulaw.cn/
fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=143870. See “Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Anli Zhidao
Gongzuo de Guiding] Shishi Xize [Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the Supreme People’s Court on Case Guidance” (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court,
May. 13, 2015, effective May 13, 2015), arts. 9, 10, 11, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?
Db=chl&Gid=249447.
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judgment documents in a centralized way. The judgment documents of the people’s courts
may be published on the Internet, except for the cases involving state secrets, juvenile
delinquency and personal privacy, cases inappropriate for disclosure, and cases closed
through mediation.10
Many of the judicial decisions of Chinese courts have since been made available
online. Two of the most comprehensive online databases are “China Judgments
Online” and “Chinalawinfo.” “China Judgments Online,” maintained by the
Chinese Supreme People’s Court, contains more than 16,559,000 judgments
involving criminal, civil, administrative, state compensation, and enforcement
disputes.11 “Chinalawinfo,” established by the Legal Information Center of
Peking University in 1985, now archives the full texts of 2174 statutes and
more than 14 million judgments. Based on anecdotal evidence, Chinese judges
are increasingly turning to these resources for assistance with hard cases
(Liebman and Wu, 2007, p. 293; Stern, 2010, p. 92).12
Despite these developments, some Chinese scholars remain deeply suspicious
of the idea that cases should inform judicial decision-making. According to them,
consultation of anything other than the enacted statute will weaken the authority of
law and diminish the institutional credibility of the judiciary (Luo, 2012, p. 12).
Furthermore, because Chinese judgments lack detailed legal reasoning, they are
unlikely to be of much assistance in resolving novel issues of law. (Luo, 2012, p. 12).
Finally, Chinese judges assimilated to the civil law tradition are ill-suited to the task
of finding and interpreting judicial opinions (Zhang, 2002, pp. 112; Liang, 2007, pp.
155–156).
Amidst this debate, both data on and theorization of the influence of prior
judicial decisions of Chinese courts on same-level courts remains scant. For
example, Zuo (2015) was primarily interested in vertical, rather than horizontal,
precedent. Nevertheless, it is telling that 15% of the 1367 judges surveyed
thought that cases disseminated in the Gazette of Chinese Supreme People’s
Court and Case Guidance of Sichuan Higher People’s Court were not binding
while 48.5% agreed that “judges need not and should not resort to precedent
because China is not a case law jurisdiction.”
10 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa “Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding” he “Guanyu
Renmin Fayuan Jieshou Xinwen Meiti Yulun Jiandu de Ruogan Guiding” de Tongzhi [Notice
of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Six Provisions on Judicial Openness and Several
Provisions on the People’s Courts’ Exposure to Public Supervision through Mass Media]
(Promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Dec. 8, 2009, effective Dec. 8, 2009), http://
www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=125149.
11 This figure is as of May 14, 2016.
12 This is corroborated by conversations that we had with several court clerks.
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Two other large-scale studies of judges did not distinguish between judg-
ments of the same, or higher, court and those originating from sister courts (Dong,
2015). The first, carried out in 2004, surveyed 130 judges from courts at various
levels in Guangdong Province (Dong, 2015, pp. 169–170). 9.8% of respondents
deemed cases as having no influence on their decision-making process whereas
52.3% of respondents perceived cases as “barely influenc[ing] their decisions,”
referring to them only “when there is any unsolved problem.” 25% of the
respondents, however, indicated that “prior judgments have significant influence”
and “[t]hey will check if their opinions are consistent with prior judgments before
making final decisions.” The second, conducted by the same researcher in Zhuhai
Municipality of Guangdong Province in 2007, found that more than 90% of the
respondents paid attention to prior judgments (Dong, 2015, pp. 170–171). In the
absence of a relevant statute or an official interpretation by the Chinese Supreme
People’s Court, approximately 80% of respondents would search for prior judg-
ments while 20% would seek advice from legal scholars.
In sum, while empirical research on the influence of Chinese courts on each
other is at an early stage, it is fair to say that the Chinese judges, unlike their
counterparts in common law jurisdictions, are fractured over the influence that
cases do and should have in judicial decision-making. An inquiry into the
existence, extent, and nature of such influence does not only yield interesting
comparative insights; it also interrogates a premise that is fundamental to the
thesis of judicial diffusion.
Methodological choice
The phenomenon of judicial diffusion could be illustrated and understood by
isolating a legal policy and identifying the salient characteristics of early as
opposed to late adopters. Canon and Baum (1981) and Lutz (1997) explore the
spread of innovations in the common law of torts by focusing on the order of
their adoption by American state supreme courts. Glick (1992) takes the same
approach to the right to die. Bird and Smythe (2008, 2012) build on these
foundations, employing time hazard methods to identify the factors that affect
a state judiciary’s adoption of three employment doctrines and the strict liability
rule for manufacturing defects.13 An analytically similar study on judicial inter-
pretations of a federal sexual harassment statute was carried out by Moyer and
13 They find that federal courts “may generally provide an important ‘echo chamber’ for state
court opinions within their circuit.”
6 B. M. Chen and Z. Li
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Tankersley (2012) for the United States Courts of Appeals.14 But these methods
assume influence and do not demonstrate it.
A different approach is to look at all citations of one court by another. Harris
(1982, 1985), Caldeira (1985, 1988), and Hinkle and Nelson (2016) examined inter-
state citations in the United States.15 Solberg et al. (2006) performed the same
analysis for the United States Court of Appeals.16 More recently, Smyth and
Mishra (2011) have attempted an articulation of a cross-national theory of
judicial decision-making by applying the same framework to the Australian
State Supreme Courts.17
It is doubtful whether citations are reliable indicators of influence since “the
pervasiveness of precedents in judicial rhetoric [in common law jurisdictions]
may be more indicative of a normative expectation that all arguments be
couched in terms of precedent than a determining cause of decisions” (Phillips
and Grattet, 2000, p. 596).18 But we need not delve too deeply into this issue
here because Chinese judgments tend to be short and terse, and rarely, if ever,
refer to other cases.19 For example, a survey of 105 judges conducted in 2014 by
the China Guiding Cases Project at Stanford University found that of the 57
judges who have considered Guiding Cases in the course of adjudication, 32 of
them “did not explicitly specify, quote or paraphrase any [Guiding Cases] or any
parts of [Guiding Cases]” while 25 “quoted or paraphrased relevant part(s) of
14 They find ideological distance between panel and Supreme Court, gender composition of the
panel, and legal capital to be the most important determinants of adoption.
15 The general conclusion is that prestige, physical and cultural proximity, and coverage by the
same West reporter are key determinants of relative citation frequencies.
16 They find that out-of-circuit citations are more likely when there is less legal capital in the
circuit, when there is more dissensus in the circuit, and when the issue is one of first
impression.
17 They find physical proximity and a majority of both courts being appointed by conservative
governments to have a positive effect on the transmission of legal precedent.
18 Glick (1992) notes that “even very heavy citation may not indicate clear policy direction or
the influence of one court on another.” Walsh (1997) concludes that while “legal citations are
meaningful and useful data”, strong citations are more indicative of substantive influence on
case outcomes.
19 For instance, in one of its internal documents dated October 28, 1986, the Chinese Supreme
People’s Court admonished that “[a]ll opinions and instructions given by the Supreme People’s
Court on the application of laws shall be followed, but it is not appropriate, however, to cite
them directly.” We note, however, that since 2015, lower courts have been permitted – and
indeed, are obliged to – quote the serial number and reasoning of the Guiding Cases that they
rely on. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo De Guiding Shishi Xize [Detailed
Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Case
Guidance], art. 10, 11, issued by the Supreme People’s Court on May 13, 2015, available at:
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=249447&lib=law.
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[Guiding Cases] they considered, without explicitly specifying that the part(s)
is/are from [Guiding Cases].” (Gechlik, Philips and Lee, 2014).
Thus, we take, in contrast to the existing literature, an experimental
approach to assessing the influence of the judgments of sister courts on
Chinese judges. This methodological choice not only overcomes a major obstacle
to studying judicial diffusion in a jurisdiction that is still wedded to the civil law
tradition; it also allows us to make claims that cannot be substantiated by case
studies alone.
Research design
The influence of a prior judicial decision on judge i may be represented formally as
Ti =Yi 1ð Þ−Yi 0ð Þ
where Yi 1ð Þ is the outcome of interest (e. g. interpretation of a statute, length of
sentence) under treatment, Yi 0ð Þ is the outcome of interest under control, and
treatment is the citation of such a prior judicial decision to the judge.
Between July and August 2015, we contacted approximately 400 judges20
from 19 courts in 10 Chinese regions21 for their views on recent legal develop-
ments. These courts had previously agreed to participate in the survey.
The survey instrument contained an experimental element that involved a
hypothetical case based on Article 232 of the Chinese Criminal Law (1997) and
Article 20 of the Opinion Regarding Family Violence Cases (2015) (“Opinion”)
issued by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court.22 The former states:
whoever intentionally kills another is to be sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or not
less than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment; when the circumstances are relatively
20 The term “judge” could refer to presidents and vice presidents of the court, members of the
adjudication committees, chief judges and associate chief judges of divisions, judges, and
assistant judges. We note that not all members of the court who are referred to as “judges”
are involved in adjudication (Li, 1998; Clarke, 2003). For example, more than half of the
“judges” in the nine basic people’s court studied in Li (1998) did not actually function as
judges. The presidents of the courts did not hear cases while the chief judges of the divisions
did so only rarely. Furthermore, 12% of “judges” only handled administrative matters, such as
clerical tasks, accounting, and execution of judgments. The judges we surveyed are mostly
judges and assistant judges who are regularly engaged in adjudication.
21 The regions are Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shandong, Shanghai,
Tianjin, and Zhejiang.
22 These interpretations carry “full legal force.” Zuigao Ren-min Fayuan Guanyu Sifa Jieshi
Gongzuo De Guiding [Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on the Judicial Interpretation
Work], art. 5, available at: http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=89508&lib=law.
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minor, he is to be sentenced to not less than three years and not more than 10 years of
fixed-term imprisonment.
The latter provides that “fatal retaliation by a long-term (changqi) [emphasis
added] victim of domestic abuse against the abuser may be (keyi) [emphasis
added] eligible for sentence mitigation.” We note that the law therefore grants to
judges the authority to reduce the sentence of such a defendant, but does not
compel them to do so. All judges were presented with the original legal materi-
als and the following case facts:
Hong Xiao (girlfriend) and Ming Li (boyfriend) had lived together for three months. During the
period of cohabitation, Hong Xiao was often assaulted by Ming Li. Afraid of breaking-up, yet
unable to bear Ming Li’s abuse, Hong Xiao stabbed Ming Li while he was sleeping, killing him.
In addition, judges randomly assigned to treatment23 were given the supplemen-
tary information:
A court in Henan Province recently heard a similar case (there, the girlfriend and boyfriend
had cohabited for two months) and gave the female criminal a lenient sentence.
Judges were then asked if the leniency provision of Article 20 of the Opinion is
applicable to the facts before them, and the length of the sentence they would
impose.
Our choice of legal issue in this scenario was informed by two major
considerations. First, interviews and surveys of judges suggest that the judicial
decisions of other courts are most helpful when the issue being presented is one
of first impression (Dong, 2015; Liebman and Wu, 2007, p. 293). Second, a case
concerning a salient social problem, domestic violence, is likely to lead to a
higher response rate from this rarely sampled population.
In addition, we asked each judge for his or her gender, length of judicial
service, academic background, and bar passage. Given the heterogeneity among
Chinese judges,24 information on these variables enables us to identify charac-
teristics that are associated with treatment effects.
23 The form of randomization deployed is complete randomization.
24 Traditionally, Chinese judges do not need to have any specialized education or certification
to hold office (Clarke, 2003), although judges in some regions were required to pass internal
examinations that were administered by the courts (Ahl, 2006). Before the passage of the Judges
Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Judges Law”) in 1995, judges could be classified into
one of three types: (1) army veterans, (2) transferred officials, and (3) college graduates (Liu,
2006, pp. 82–83). Until recently, the first two types comprised the majority of judges. For
example, between 1978–1995, only 19.4% of the new judges hired in a basic people’s court
were college graduates (Liu, 2006, pp. 82–83). Li (1998) likewise discovered that only 3% of
incumbent judges in nine basic people’s courts had graduated from law school. Whereas the
The Foundations of Judicial Diffusion in China 9
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If Chinese judges are influenced by prior judicial decisions, one should
expect their interpretation of the Opinion to be influenced by treatment.
Furthermore, if sentencing is guided by judges’ application of the relevant
legal standards, one should expect treatment to reduce the sentences awarded
by judges who are already sympathetic to the defendant.
Results and analysis
407 completed responses (out of 488 surveys fielded) were returned. The dis-
tribution of the 4 covariates – gender, length of judicial service, academic
background, and bar passage – are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Distribution of judge covariates.
Gender Total Proportion
Male  .
Female  .
Experience
< Years  .
– Years  .
– Years  .
> Years  .
Academic Background
Bachelor  .
Masters  .
Doctorate  .
Continuing  .
Bar Passage
Passed  .
Yet to Pass  .
Judges Law raised the standards for judges appointed after 2002, judges who were already
serving before the implementation of the Judges Law could remain on bench by attending
trainings. In 2011, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the
Ministry of Justice introduced measures requiring judges appointed for the first time to have
passed the bar examination (sifa kaoshi).
10 B. M. Chen and Z. Li
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203 judges were assigned to treatment and 204 to control. As a check for
covariate balance, we ran t and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for each covariate.
The p-values, depicted in Figure 1, suggest that the randomization succeeded in
achieving covariate balance between both groups.
Of the 203 judges in the treated group, 161 agreed that a lenient sentence would
be warranted pursuant to Article 232 of the Chinese Criminal Law (1997) and
Article 20 of the Opinion, 32 expressed a contrary view and 10 declined to
respond. The corresponding numbers for the 204 judges in the control group
are 145, 51, and 8.
We first test the hypothesis that treatment has no effect on any judge, that is,
Yi 1ð Þ=Yi 0ð Þ
for all i, finding that the null hypothesis may be rejected at conventional levels
of significance (p=0.026, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided; p=0.023, Pearson χ2,
two-sided). We also estimate the sample average treatment effect by adopting a
linear probability model and regressing interpretation of the rule on treatment
and other variables.25 A response that the defendant qualifies for consideration
Figure 1: Covariate balance between treatment and control groups.
25 See generally Gelman and Hill (2006, pp. 167–181). The ordinary least squares estimate is not
an unbiased estimator for the average treatment effect once covariates are included in the
The Foundations of Judicial Diffusion in China 11
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for leniency is coded as “1” whereas a contrary response is coded as “0.” The
Ordinary Least Squares estimates for the coefficients and robust standard errors
are laid out in Table 2.
These results indicate that treatment had an effect on how judges inter-
preted the Opinion. In particular, judges informed about the holding of the
Henan court tended to agree that the sentence of a victim of domestic abuse
who had fatally retaliated against her boyfriend after three months of cohabita-
tion could be mitigated.
Re-estimating the full model, this time including interaction terms between
treatment and every covariate, we find that the treatment effect is not uniform
across subgroups: judges who have yet to pass the bar are more likely to resist
the prior judicial decision while judges who have passed the bar are more likely
to be swayed by it (Table 3).26
Figure 2: Distribution of judges’ responses to leniency question.
regression. It is, however, still consistent (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Moreover, Green and
Aronow (2011) demonstrate, in an unpublished manuscript, that “bias tends to be negligible
when the sample size is greater than 20.”
26 We note, out of abundance of caution, that the heterogeneity in treatment effect indicates
that passage of the bar examination is a predictor of a judges’ susceptibility to the influence of
prior judicial decisions from sister courts; it does not establish causation.
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Table 2: OLS regression of judges’ interpretation on treatment and other covariates.
Dependent Variable Interpretation Interpretation Interpretation
(Intercept) .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Treatment .* .* .*
(.) (.) (.)
Female . .
(.) (.)
Experience: – Years . .
(.) (.)
Experience: – Years .* .*
(.) (.)
Experience: > Years . .
(.) (.)
Education: Masters . .
(.) (.)
Education: Doctorate .*** .
(.) (.)
Education: Continuing −. −.
(.) (.)
Yet to Pass Bar −. −.
(.) (.)
Court Fixed Effects No No Yes
N   
RMSE . . .
R . . .
*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001
Table 3: OLS regression of judges’ interpretation on treatment and
other covariates, interacted.
Dependent Variable Interpretation
(Intercept) .***
(.)
Treatment .*
(.)
Female −.
(.)
Experience: – Years .
(.)
Experience: – Years .
(.)
(continued )
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At the sentencing stage, judges who believed leniency to be legally warranted,
regardless of assignment to treatment or control, sentenced less harshly.
However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that treatment had no effect on
the length of the sentences meted out by any judge (p =0.622, Fisher’s exact test,
two-sided; p =0.614, Pearson χ2, two-sided). The regression estimates for the
sample average treatment effect on length of sentences are also statistically
indistinguishable from zero (Table 4).27
Table 3: (continued )
Dependent Variable Interpretation
Experience: > Years .
(.)
Education: Masters .
(.)
Education: Doctorate .*
(.)
Education: Continuing −.
(.)
Yet to Pass Bar .
(.)
Treatment and Female .
(.)
Treatment and Experience: – Years −.
(.)
Treatment and Experience:– Years .
(.)
Treatment and Experience: > Years −.
(.)
Treatment and Education: Masters −.
(.)
Treatment and Education: Doctorate −.
(.)
Treatment and Education: Continuing .
(.)
Treatment and Yet to Pass Bar −.**
(.)
Court Fixed Effects Yes
N 
RMSE .
R .
*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001
27 The results for a multivariate regression on both outcome variables are presented in Table 6.
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External validity
Could one infer, on the basis of a survey experiment conducted on a non-
random subset of courts, the response of the average Chinese judge to the
citation of previous judicial decisions? There are certainly reasons for caution.
The interaction occasioned by the survey is brief and in the absence of intrinsic
motivation, respondents might be tempted to satisfice by, for instance, agreeing
with any asserted statement or endorsing the status quo rather than social
change (Krosnick, 1991). Furthermore, it is not clear if the sample that selected
itself into the experiment is representative of the population of Chinese judges.
Although not nationally representative, the China Guiding Cases Project reports
that of the approximately 5000 judges sitting in the Basic People’s Courts or
Intermediate People’s Court of a city in South China, “85% have bachelor of law
Table 4: OLS regression of judges’ sentence on treatment and other covariates.
Dependent Variable Sentence (Years) Sentence (Years) Sentence (Years)
(Intercept) .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Treatment −. −. −.
(.) (.) (.)
Female −.* −.*
(.) (.)
Experience:
– Years
. .
(.) (.)
Experience:
– Years
. .
(.) (.)
Experience:
> Years
.** .
(.) (.)
Education: Masters −. −.
(.) (.)
Education: Doctorate −. −.
(.) (.)
Education:
Continuing
−. −.
(.) (.)
Yet to Pass Bar −. −.
(.) (.)
Court Fixed Effects No No Yes
N   
RMSE . . .
R . . .
*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001
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degrees …, 30% have master of law degrees, and 0.4% have doctorates.” In
comparison, 50.7% of our respondents have a master degree as their highest
qualification.
But there are some grounds for believing that the results presented here
are generalizable. First, the survey is short and the number of involved
queries, few. Thus, the cognitive load on respondents is unlikely to induce
satisficing behavior. Moreover, though not randomly drawn from the overall
population, we note that except for those who have yet to pass the bar, judges
exhibited qualitatively similar responses to treatment. Our estimates might be
biased as estimates for the population average treatment effect if judges who
have yet to pass the bar are over or under-represented in our sample. But we
suggest that this concern, while valid, is mitigated by the small proportion of
judges who have yet to pass the bar (in the overall population) and their
concentration in an older generation of judges. Lastly, the stimulus adminis-
tered in the experiment is not too far removed from the situation faced by a
judge in an adjudicative setting. As we have already observed, Chinese judi-
cial opinions tend to be short on legal reasoning and a judge is unlikely to
learn anything more from studying a previous case than its facts and the final
outcome.
In conclusion, it is probably fair to say that cases decided by sister courts
have de facto, if not de jure, influence on Chinese judges.
Mechanisms
What, then, explains the experimental findings? We should first address a
concern that our results are being driven, in the main, by an experimental
demand effect. That is, the judges surveyed may have conformed their responses
to the hypothesis being tested so as to please the experimenters who assume, for
the purposes of the experiment, an authoritative role (Zizzo, 2012). We hazard,
however, that this is unlikely to be the case here. As a preliminary matter,
demand effects are likely to be attenuated in a between-subjects design like
the one here (Charness et al., 2012). While it remains true that “in social
encounters, including laboratory experiments, most are engaged in a constant
search for cues about how they are supposed to behave” (Loewenstein, 1999, p.
30) the familiarity of the adjudicative task to serving judges should reduce their
reliance on the experimental element as a source of hints on how they should
act. Moreover, as the anonymized survey responses were completed by the
judges in the privacy of their chambers and returned to us in sealed envelopes
through court intermediaries, the risk that judges might succumb, consciously or
16 B. M. Chen and Z. Li
Brought to you by | Columbia University Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/3/19 6:40 PM
otherwise, to any perceived signals from us is slight. Finally, given that the
ambivalence about the legal status of prior judicial decisions from sister courts
among Chinese jurists, there is little reason for judges to deem one response as
being more appropriate than another. Insofar as the judges are aware that the
citation of the prior judicial decision of a sister court is an attempt to persuade
them to rule similarly (and they are so persuaded for factors to be discussed
later), this is the treatment that we seek to administer and one that corresponds
to the objective of legal advocacy outside of the experimental context.
Another contending explanation is anchoring – the tendency for responses to
be biased in favor of an initially suggested value, or anchor. To illustrate, a series of
experiments has shown that a plaintiff’s demand for damages exerts immense
influence over the amount of damages eventually awarded in both environmental
and personal injury cases (Malouff and Schutte, 1989; Chapman and Bornstein,
1996; Hastie et al., 1999; Marti and Wissler, 2000). These effects have also been
observed evenwhen the anchor is irrelevant to the issue at hand. A frivolousmotion
to dismiss for failure to meet a jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement
reduced the damages found by United States magistrate judges in a hypothetical
scenario (Guthrie et al., 2001). More strikingly, random values generated by a roll of
the dice affected the sentencing decision of German legal professionals to the same
extent that relevant anchors did (Englich et al., 2006). A recent contribution to this
body of literature extends these insights to the interpretation of vague legal stan-
dards (Feldman et al., 2016). When presented with a list of measures that a water
company could have taken to maintain a sewage system, students exposed to
examples applying the negligence rule to the costliest option set the standard of
care higher than did those exposed to examples applying the negligence rule to the
least costly option. Similarly, the amount suggested by the controlling shareholder
of a trading company to its board swayed the judgment of lawyers as to themaximal
dividend that a court would approve under a solvency test. The same phenomenon
could be occurring here, in that the mention of “three months” in the facts of the
case from theHenan court might have served to anchor the duration of cohabitation
that judges consider to be “long-term”.
Yet another alternative explanation for our findings, one that does not
necessarily rule out anchoring, is judges regarding prior judicial decisions as
having some precedential value.28 There are several individual and institutional
28 As used here, having precedential value means that prior judicial decisions are a pro tanto
reason for deciding an analogous case similarly. We add that anchoring and regarding prior
judicial decisions as having precedential value may interact. The latter could amplify the
influence of former while the former could be the mechanism that translates the latter into
tangible outcomes. The distinction is therefore one of relevance. Although the literature on
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reasons for adherence to prior judicial decisions: fairness, predictability, effi-
ciency, and credibility. The first, fairness, is the idea that like cases should be
treated alike. It seems intuitively unfair that a defendant’s fate should hinge on
the judge assigned to his case rather than on its facts. The second, predictability,
emphasizes the value of stability. Since people arrange their affairs in anticipa-
tion of the legal consequences, it may be “better that the law be certain than that
every judge should speculate upon improvements.”29 The third, efficiency, is the
argument that channeling decisional energies away from settled cases conserves
scarce judicial resources (Macey, 1989, p. 111; Farber, 2006, p. 1177). The fourth,
credibility, refers to the legitimacy that courts derive from acting consistently
(Epstein and Knight, 1998, p. 544; Schauer, 1987). As Liebman and Wu (2007,
319) argued in the context of China,
the legitimacy and power of courts stems in part from their adherence to higher or neutral
principles … in a developing legal system the search for such rules may be more difficult.
That is why the simplest principle of all – acting as other courts or judges have done – is so
important. Lacking any other particular claim to legitimacy, the judge may at least say that
the court is acting in a manner consistent with what other courts have done. Courts and
legal systems that treat like cases alike would appear both more deserving of and more
likely to receive public trust.
There are also other incentives, unique to the Chinese legal system, for taking
note of cases. For Chinese judges, who are subject to the internal supervision of
their hierarchical superiors and external interference by political actors (He,
2012; Woo, 1999), a prior judicial decision that has been left undisturbed could
signal the political acceptability of a certain legal disposition.
To further examine the nature of the influence of prior judicial decisions on
Chinese judges, we fielded a second survey that targeted students in Chinese law
schools. This survey featured the same experimental element as the one
designed for judges.30 If judges regard cases as having precedential value by
virtue of their institutional role or because of socialization, the influence of prior
anchoring has not come to a firm verdict about the relationship between the relevance of the
anchor and the size of anchoring effects (Englich and Mussweiler, 2001; Glöckner and Englich,
2015), treating prior judicial decisions as having precedential value means, at least, that
pedigree matters (Schauer, 1987).
29 Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Ves. 481, 497, 32 Eng. Rep. 441, 447 (1803).
30 The actual experiment had three arms: students were assigned to either control, treatment
that attributed the stimuli to a criminal law professor based in Henan University (“academic”),
or treatment that attributed the stimuli to a court in Henan Province (“judicial”). We introduced
the academic arm as a pilot for a separate study. The analysis of this arm has therefore been
omitted from the manuscript.
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judicial decisions should be felt more strongly among them than among law
students.
The instrument was administered online through Qualtrics in October 2015,
and a total of 385 completed responses were returned.31 Pooling these and the
earlier responses, we estimated separate linear probability models for both
outcome variables that included, as dependent variables, an indicator for treat-
ment, an indicator for judges, and an interaction between these two indicators
(Table 5).32 As the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, we conclude that the stimulus had a uniform effect on
judges and law students alike. This finding tells against the hypothesis that
Chinese judges have, due to their situation or environment, developed a special
regard for the prior judicial decisions of sister courts.
Discussion
To revisit our main result, judges apprised of the decision of the Henan court to
grant leniency to a defendant who had co-habited with her boyfriend for two
months were, on average, more inclined than judges who had not been so
apprised to classify a cohabitation term of three months as “long-term” and
hence, falling inside the ambit of the Opinion. Two features of the data merit
Table 5: OLS regression of pooled responses to interpretation and sentence on treatment.
Dependent Variable Interpretation Sentence (Years)
(Intercept) .*** .***
(.) (.)
Treatment .** −.
(.) (.)
Judge . .*
(.) (.)
Treatment and Judge −. .
(.) (.)
N  
RMSE . .
R . .
*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001
31 The total number of completed responses collected across all three arms is 558.
32 The results for a multivariate regression on both outcome variables is presented in Table 7.
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further discussion and research. First, judges who have yet to pass the bar did
not respond to treatment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that their non-respon-
siveness is due to a firmly entrenched conviction, exhibited in the discharge of
their regular judicial duties, that cases are to be excluded from the search for
statutory meaning.33
Second, judges who were treated did not seem to have lightened their
sentences. The cause of this is harder to fathom. If an experimental demand
effect were the explanans for the main result, then the judges who gave in to a
perceived expectation that they find the defendant eligible for leniency should
also have been (socially) nudged into handing down lower sentences.
Furthermore, if the judges’ understandings of “long-term” were anchored by
the allusion to “three months” in the stimulus, then we should also expect, on
some theories of anchoring, that the sentences should have been biased down-
wards as well. For example, even if judges did not make an active effort at
applying the appropriate legal standard, the search for confirmatory evidence
that cohabitation of two to three months qualified as “long-term,” and hence for
leniency, should have activated information supporting sentence mitigation (See
Strack and Mussweiler, 1997).
Table 7: Multivariate OLS regression of pooled interpretation and sentence on treatment.
Dependent Variable Interpretation Sentence
(Intercept) .*** .***
(.) (.)
Treatment .** −.
(.) (.)
Judge . .*
(.) (.)
Treatment and Judge −. .
(.) (.)
N  
RMSE . .
R . .
*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001
33 This is the general view expressed by a judge in one of the participating courts that the
authors managed to re-contact after the survey responses had been collected and analyzed. As
the survey responses are anonymized, we are unable to know whether this judge completed the
survey and if so, whether he or she had been assigned to treatment or control.
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On the other hand, it is conceivable that because the anchor was commu-
nicated in months while the sentence in years, the application of “long-term” to
the facts of the case, also communicated in months, was anchored whereas
sentencing was not. An articulation of a scale distortion theory of anchoring
demonstrated, for instance, that estimating the weight of a blue whale in pounds
affected a subsequent judgement of the weight of a giraffe in pounds, but the
same activity conducted in tons did not (Frederick and Mochon, 2011, p. 4).34 If
this mechanism is the operational one, then the anchoring effect observed here
is “shallow” in that its “[influence] on responses … [is] unaccompanied by any
corresponding effects on the mental representations of the object being evalu-
ated” (Mochon and Frederick, 2013, p. 70; see also; Lynch et al., 1991).35
Finally, it may just be that judges, like law students, see a prior judicial
decision as offering a plausible interpretation of an ambiguous legal standard,
one that is prima facie acceptable.36 But since the rule here is permissive rather
than mandatory, respondents may not have found the defendant sufficiently
sympathetic as to move them to exercise their discretion for her benefit.
Conclusion
The Chinese courts operate in a complex political environment. The pressure of
public opinion (Ji, 2013), the resources of local elites (Clarke, 1995; He, 2011;
Lubman, 1999; Randall, 2002), and the leverage of local governments (Fu, 2015,
pp. 171–173, 186; Stern, 2010) could relegate the influence of cases to the back-
ground. That said, fluid incentives, legal uncertainty, and political ambiguity
can combine to reserve to judges a certain measure of discretion in cases that are
not so salient (Stern, 2010). In such circumstances, the influence exerted by
sister courts on one another might facilitate the spread of policy across jurisdic-
tions through the transmission of doctrines or interpretations.
34 See also Rachlinski, et al. (2015 p. 717) (“Anchors distort the sense of scale that facilitates a
reliable translation of a qualitative sense of the appropriate sentence into a numeric sentence.
So too does the actual scale. Apparently, 12 months seems different to judges than 1 year.”)
35 While our experimental design does not allow us to identify the cognitive process, or
processes (Bahnik and Strack, 2016, p. 97), driving anchoring here, we note that our findings
are reminiscent of those of Brewer et al. (2007) where the assessment of patients and physicians
of risk were anchored, but their treatment choices in the face of that risk were not. Given that
anchoring has been shown to bias legal decision-making in a variety of settings, the robustness
of these results across different decisional contexts should be the subject of more intensive
study.
36 We thank Christoph Engel for this suggestion.
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The force and content of such diffusion rest on both the extent and the
nature of the influence exerted by prior judicial decisions. Whether judicial
diffusion is normatively desirable also cannot be answered without reference
to the same considerations. If judges are influenced by judgments coming out of
other courts because the doctrine or interpretation approved of has been scru-
tinized and found desirable or sustainable, then judicial diffusion may result in
more informed policy-making. But if judges defer to prior judicial decisions
unreflectively, there is a risk of “precedential cascades” (Talley, 1999) that
perpetuate and entrench inefficient legal rules.
This project adopted an experimental approach to evaluating the influence
of judicial decisions by sister courts on Chinese judges, finding that citation of a
case out of Henan Province had a substantial and statistically significant effect
on whether judges believed there to be a legal basis for mitigating the sentence
of a similarly-situated criminal defendant. It did not, however, lead to a reduc-
tion in the length of sentences awarded by judges. A second iteration of the
survey experiment suggests that the influence of prior judicial decisions on
judges and law students is indistinguishable, implying that role and environ-
ment are unlikely to be the explanation for the main result.
While we recognize that there is some distance between a controversy in the
courtroom and a case out of a survey, this experiment has uncovered some
questions for further study. Future research should examine more closely the
nature of the influence that prior judicial decisions exert on judges in both
common law and civil law jurisdictions (See Spamann and Klöhn, 2016).
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